INTRODUCTION
There exists yet another patriotism more rational than [fervent beliefs resting on an ancient order]: it is less generous, less passionate perhaps but more creative and lasting; it springs from education, develops with the help of laws, increases with the exercise of rights and in the end blends in a sense with personal interest.
-Alexis de Tocqueville

1
An educated populace creates an environment for innovation, accelerated economic growth, a more responsible electorate that institutes wiser policy, 2 and, as Alexis de Tocqueville noted, a wellspring for a more creative and lasting patriotism.
3 Education's centrality to the success of individuals and society is beyond dispute. 4 The longer children stay in school, the more likely they are to earn a decent wage and be independent of the state, reflecting a "growing economic premium on education and skills."
5 Nor can the undereducated exert as much influence on the political dialogue in this democratic society, undermining the uniquely compelling ideal that "government of the people by the people for the people" 6 can flourish.
If education is the wellspring of the most stable patriotism, then there is one more reason our failed public education system has become a national priority. The failure of public education is more extreme for poor 7 and minority children. The 2000 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) for fourth graders found 63% of African Americans, 58% of Hispanic Americans, and 47% of all 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., children in urban schools reading below a basic level. 9 The largest and most ambitious federal effort to address the ramifications of inadequate public education is Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). 10 Initially structured without enforcement mechanisms and unsuccessful in achieving educational equity, 11 Congress has repeatedly revised Title I, introducing a system of standards and accountability that formed the basis of the 2001 version of the Act, entitled No Child Left Behind (NCLB).
12
NCLB included stricter testing requirements, increased accountability to parents, and required for the first time that all children reach proficiency in state educational standards. 13 This Comment examines the rights parents and other aggrieved parties have or should have under NCLB to hold a state accountable if its programs do not meet the requirements of the Act. This Comment contends that without private enforcement under section 1983, 14 the promise of NCLB will go unfulfilled. Although under NCLB the Secretary of Education may enforce state compliance with its obligations under the Act through his power to terminate state funds, 15 Title I, unlike many Spending Clause statutes, does not provide an administrative process or an explicit private cause of action for individuals to 9 NAT'L CTR. FOR § 1983 (2000) . 15 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g) (Supp. I 2001) . Fund termination is a dramatic step that is rarely taken under any Spending Clause program. Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme Court's Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 292-93 (1996) . In the case of Title I there is concern, however, that the continuing achievement gap is due partially to a lack of federal enforcement of Title I and the states' belief that fund termination is an empty threat. Zamora, supra note 11, at 431-32. bring claims and enforce compliance with state or local obligations. Moreover, federal funding termination is a very limited remedy. Should intended beneficiaries be able to surmount the absence of an individual administrative enforcement process, they would have to ask the Secretary of Education to financially cripple the program they are trying to improve, an unsatisfactory and unlikely avenue of relief. Absent express statutory avenues for individual enforcement, an implied cause of action or an implied right of action under section 1983 become the only possible tools for private enforcement of state obligations under the Act. In recent opinions, the Supreme Court, sensitive to separation of powers concerns, has limited the ability of individuals to bring enforcement actions by an implied cause of action in the absence of express rights-creating language indicating congressional intent to create remedies. 16 Moreover, in 2002 the Court issued Gonzaga University v. Doe, in which it cited to its implied cause of action analysis to determine the existence of a substantive right to be enforced under section 1983. 17 This reference has caused some to question whether this remaining avenue for the vindication of federal statutory rights has also been narrowed. 18 This Comment argues that Gonzaga's references to implied cause of action analysis should not be read as conflating the two avenues of rights enforcement, or as justifying the notion that there are no enforceable rights in NCLB. To use as narrow an approach to imply rights as to imply remedies would defy clear congressional intent both in creating section 1983 as a separate cause of action for enforcing substantive rights and in passing NCLB to solve a problem of national concern. This Comment contends that a better interpretation of Gonzaga would focus on congressional intent to create rights--as in implied cause of action cases--but would look to a wider category of indicia to show intent. While the Court has made clear that it will no longer imply causes of action simply to further statutory purpose, 19 it 16 The Court found in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) , that the power to create remedies is a legislative one and that judges violate separation of powers principles and infringe on congressional lawmaking authority when they imply private rights of action to enforce statutes. The Court demanded "'rights-creating' language" not solely as evidence to create rights, since in this case the right against disparate impact discrimination was assumed, but as evidence of intent to create a remedy. Id. at 286. 17 536 U. S. 273, 279-87 (2002) . 18 See infra text accompanying notes 73-80 (examining the evolution of this doctrine and questioning its current status). 19 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287.
can and should include statutory purpose and scheme as indicators of congressional intent to create rights.
20
A court using this approach would find that NCLB meets the requirements for rights creation under section 1983, especially because of NCLB's individually focused language and inclusion of the contextual factors considered in traditional implied cause of action analysis. Any finding to the contrary is inconsistent with congressional intent, vitiates NCLB enforcement, and undermines section 1983 jurisprudence in general.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of Title I, emphasizing the current statute's dependence on individual action and enforcement. Part II briefly describes the doctrinal development in two relevant areas: a) the Supreme Court's reluctance to imply rights and remedies in statutes that do not expressly provide for them and b) its uncertain approach to implying substantive rights enforceable under section 1983, which does expressly provide a remedy for such rights. Although congressional intent is the touchstone in both inquiries, this Comment argues that the test for intent is broader and more flexible in the latter than the former, and that the Court's most recent precedent, Gonzaga, supports this conclusion. Part III analyzes whether, in light of the legislative language, purpose and context as well as Supreme Court precedent including Gonzaga, NCLB gives rise to enforceable rights. This question is addressed by examining one potential claim: whether parents can bring a section 1983 action against State Educational Agency (SEA) officials to enforce state level obligations under section 6311(b)(8) of NCLB. 21 Part IV suggests that not only does respect for congressional intent argue for a broad reading of Gonzaga, federalism concerns do not justify narrowing the scope of section 1983 enforcement but, on the contrary, support a reading of Gonzaga that favors finding enforceable rights under the statute. (SEAs) in return for a commitment to provide programs benefiting educationally disadvantaged students. ESEA was aimed at "the effects of the conditions of group poverty upon the individual student."
22 Title I is still the federal government's largest investment in education, 23 as well as the bedrock of its commitment to equality of opportunity.
24
Title I was passed amid great controversy between those who thought education should be under local control and those who believed effective education was a national interest that should be addressed by the national government.
25 As a result, Title I stated a bold goal but was concerned almost solely with the equity of funding. The requirements for programs were vague, and ESEA lacked an evaluation component or an effective enforcement mechanism.
26 Scholars and advocates have offered several reasons for the failure of Title I to achieve educational parity, but it is agreed that the lack of evaluation and enforcement created significant barriers to Title I's effectiveness. In 2001, both Congress and the President, in a clear statement that educational parity-not state promises-was the goal of Title I, overhauled NCLB to address the program's shortcomings. 28 As a result, districts and states have specific obligations under NCLB to the Department of Education, schools, parents, and students to ensure that the goal of 100% proficiency is met. 29 The new parental notification and choice provisions implement a market-based reform strategy. 30 As explained by John E. Chubb, giving parents a choice among public schools while removing guaranteed financial support for existing schools will force underachieving institutions to improve in response to competitive pressure. 31 That Congress attempted to implement this educational reform by using competition is made clear by the structure of the Act and its legislative history, as well as from administrative statements concerning the Act. 32 The success of the effort is premised on parental knowledge and action as well as fulfillment of the SEAs' commitment to contribute the funding and support required to provide both necessary information and viable choices. 28 The White House described these failings as: (1) its failure to address the achievement gap between rich and poor students, minority and white students; (2) a lack of flexibility at state and district levels to address unique concerns; (3) continued investment in programs that had not ever been proven effective; and (4) 
II. IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION & SECTION 1983 ENFORCEMENT
The existence of section 1983, an independent statute that creates remedies without creating rights, has forced the Court to employ separate inquiries when looking to imply remedies in private cause of action cases and substantive rights enforceable under section 1983. Although Gonzaga made clear that courts should employ a congressional intent-based inquiry in both instances, 33 differences in the concerns underlying each inquiry require a broader and more flexible approach when determining congressional intent to create rights. When implying remedies, courts may view the existence of other statutory remedies as creating a presumption against congressional intent to provide further avenues of recourse.
34
To imply remedies in this situation, in the absence of clear statements to do so, would not only be overreaching on the part of a court, but may encourage Congress to avoid these difficult questions of remediation in abdication of their Article I responsibilities.
35
To deal with these separation of powers concerns, the Supreme Court has instituted a strict clear statement rule for courts looking for congressional intent to create enforceable rights.
In suits against state officials acting under color of federal funding statutes, however, Congress has created an independent remedy. The Court has found that section 1983 overcomes the negative presumption against private enforceability in implied remedy cases.
36
In this instance, courts must still look to congressional intent before implying substantive rights enforceable under section 1983, but that test should not have to meet the burden that exists in the implied remedy context. Courts can achieve this balance by looking to a wider variety of indicia of congressional intent when implying substantive rights. Significant frustration of statutory purpose in the absence of private enforceability, the creation of accountability to individuals, and clear statements requiring universal attainment of statutory goals should be 33 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
39
Lower courts used the test to find implied rights of action in several statutes, relying especially on the third prong of the Cort v. Ash test, the furtherance of statutory purpose. 40 The Court distinguished between statutes that speak in "precatory terms," meant only to convey preferences for certain kinds of treatment and assist the states to improve services, versus those statutes that explicitly impose "obligations" on a state to fund certain rights. 60 Under the test that emerged, the Court would 56 448 U.S. 1 (1980) . 57 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9 (referring to the presumption in favor of enforceability of substantive rights under section 1983 and distinguishing the inquiry from that involved in implied rights of action cases). Justice Brennan's six-to-three decision in Thiboutot was accompanied by an adamant dissent written by Justice Powell and joined by then-Justice Rehnquist. The dissent argued that the Court's decision would unreasonably and "dramatically expand the liability of state and local officials" by subjecting them to liability for all sorts of federal statutory violations. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 12 (Powell, J., dissenting). Additionally, Powell contended that the interpretation of "and laws" in section 1983 should be limited to civil rights statutes. S. 498 (1990) , the Court applied the approach set out in earlier cases and in a five-to-four vote found enforceable rights in the statute at hand. The dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist (who was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy) disagreed and argued that, at most, the plaintiffs had procedural rights to have the state follow the procedure set out in the provision, but not to hold the state ac-only imply rights when the text and structure of the act at issue clearly imposed mandatory funding obligations. Eleven years later in Suter v. Artist M., the Court narrowed this test, confusing the standard for implying substantive rights and the standard for implying enforceable rights at work in implied remedies cases. 61 The Court in Pennhurst had called for signs of an unambiguous intent for a statute to create a binding obligation on the state. The Court in Suter rephrased the inquiry, stating that it was looking for language to "unambiguously confer upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce the requirement."
62
This new phrasing is analogous to the more rigorous standard required in the implied remedies cases where plaintiffs have the burden of showing congressional intent to create a right and a remedy. The dissent argued that this new standard violated the presumption in favor of private enforceability once the substantive right is determined.
63
The change in approach in Suter elicited concern from Congress, 64 and led to confusion in lower courts. We have traditionally looked at three factors when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.
70
Suter became part of the third prong 71 of this test. The Blessing decision equated this requirement with the Pennhurst standard of "mandatory rather than precatory terms." 72 The Court seemed to recognize that the implication of substantive rights for which a remedy already exists requires a different and more relaxed standard. To employ the same standard would vitiate congressional intent in creating section 1983 and reaffirmed the difference in the wake of the Suter decision.
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court, purporting to clarify its section 1983 jurisprudence, introduced new elements into its analysis without specifying their relationship to the Blessing test. 73 Falling short of Suter's demand for an unambiguous right to enforce, the majority called for the statute to provide an "unambiguously conferred right," 74 which would be determined based on an inquiry "no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case." 75 The inquiry is "whether or not Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries."
76
It is not enough that petitioners are in the "zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect," 77 courts should look for "rights-creating language" with "individually focused terminology," such as that found in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
78
Rather Congress either did not create an enforceable right or created a complete remedial scheme, " § 1983 remains a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed violations of federal law"). 70 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (citations omitted than reserving consideration of the statutory enforcement mechanism until after the determination of rights creation, the majority considered the enforcement mechanism as part of its initial inquiry. The Court found that an enforcement scheme that provided a centralized administrative avenue to hear individual complaints was not sufficient to satisfy the Sea Clammers test, 79 but buttressed their understanding that the statutory language did not confer individual rights.
80
Gonzaga clearly directs courts to adopt the implied right of action approach with its focus on congressional intent. What is unclear is whether the Court meant to adopt the singular focus on language exemplified by Sandoval, where the right was assumed and the Court only sought to determine intent for private enforceability, or to allow more varied indicators of intent in recognition of section 1983 as a congressionally created remedy. In his Gonzaga dissent, Justice Stevens feared a shift to the former and explained why this restrictive implied right of action standard is unnecessary:
[O]ur implied right of action cases "reflec[t] a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of remedies for violations of statutes." However, imposing the implied right of action framework upon the § 1983 inquiry . . . is not necessary: The separation-of-powers concerns present in the implied right of action context "are not present in a § 1983 case," because Congress expressly authorized private suits in § 1983 itself. 81 Justice Stevens argued that the Sandoval standard contradicted the majority's assertion that a section 1983 plaintiff should not shoulder the burden of demonstrating congressional intent for enforceability.
82
Implied remedies cases, he asserted, focus on individual "rightscreating language" because the Court needed a level of certainty required to find an implied remedy in the statute. § 2000d (2000) . FERPA, the statute at issue in Gonzaga, commanded that "no funds shall be made available" to institutions that have prohibited policies, a mandate two steps removed from the individual interests that Doe was trying to vindicate in court. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287.
79 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289-90. 80 Id. at 290 n.8. 81 Id. at 300 (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 82 See id. at 301 (citing the majority investigation of whether "Congress . . . intended private suits to be brought"). 83 Id.
the test for determining rights creation should not be based on the same criteria.
84
While statutory language is an important consideration in Gonzaga, unlike the Court's analysis in Sandoval, it is not the only factor examined. The reasoning in Gonzaga is akin to the older approach found in the Cort v. Ash test. 85 The Cort v. Ash approach directs attention to the statutory purpose and context, as did the Court in Gonzaga. While requiring that the Act "especially benefit," rather than just "benefit," the plaintiff, 86 it does not require the same singular focus on language that the Court has demanded in recent implied cause of action cases. 87 While applying the new cause of action analysis to section 1983 cases would be devastating to individuals seeking private enforcement, an inquiry that includes legislative purpose and context as indicators of congressional intent to create rights would limit, but not end, section 1983 enforcement actions.
Since the Gonzaga majority does not claim to overrule any former precedent, it does not explain whether it intends for courts to follow the Sandoval implied right of action approach and look solely for individually focused rights-creating language, to merely indicate that lower courts should be more sparing in finding rights, 88 or to retain the Blessing approach to imply substantive rights and the Thiboutot presumption of enforceability, but with greater focus on indications of congressional intent to create substantive rights. 89 This Comment applies, and then argues for, the latter reading of Gonzaga, but with inclusion of a broader spectrum of indicia of intent than allowed under 84 Id. at 301-303. 85 See supra text accompanying notes 38-44 (describing the Cort v. Ash test). While the second prong refers to intent to create a remedy, it can easily be relevant to section 1983 by replacing "remedy" with "right." While courts are no longer willing to imply a remedy to further the purpose of an act, as suggested by the third prong, courts should be willing to examine statutory purpose and context in the determination of congressional intent to create individual rights. It is arguably harder to make the fourth prong relevant to rights creation without infringing on congressional legislative power. 86 In a recent decision, the Third Circuit followed this latter interpretation of Gonzaga in order to find a private right of action in three provisions of the Medicaid Act. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189-93 (3d Cir. 2004) . To determine whether the statute created rights, the Court applied the Blessing test to determine whether the plaintiffs fell in the zone of interest that the statute was meant to protect and then looked to make sure that the language was individually focused in a way necessary to create rights. Id. at 189-90. In a second inquiry the Court examined the rest of the statute to make sure that rights created under the specific provisions furthered the purpose of the Act as a whole. Under the first prong of the Blessing test, Congress must intend that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. 94 In Gonzaga, the Court stipulated that it is "rights, not the broader or vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests,' that may be enforced under the authority of that section." 95 The purpose of NCLB is to create an individual right to an equal opportunity for an effective education. Section 6301 provides, "the purpose of this subchapter . . . is to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and State academic assessments."
96
This language makes clear that the statute creates a right to the same extent required by implied cause of action cases and not a benefit to a group of people within the "zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect."
97
The statute is both "phrased in terms of the persons benefited," and has "an unmistakable focus on the benefited class. In the same vein, choice and SES provisions against districts. For that reason, detailed analysis of that court's treatment of those provisions is beyond the purview of this Comment. The decision, however, was problematic because it did not consider the context of the provision within the Act. It failed to analyze the purpose of the statute when looking for rights-creating language or the centrality of parental action to the market-based improvement mechanism at work in the Act. In addition, the court did not address the completeness of the centralized enforcement mechanism. The focus is not "two steps removed," 101 as in FERPA, 102 which focused on the Secretary of Education's distribution of funds. Like the civil rights statutes mentioned above, NCLB is an affirmative grant of rights to children, not a prohibition against fund disbursement to institutions engaged in disfavored practices.
While some might argue that the term "all children," unlike "person," has an "'aggregate' focus" of the type ruled out in Gonzaga, 103 several factors demonstrate that this language was intended to create an individual right to an opportunity for an effective education for each and every child in America's public schools. In Gonzaga, the Court contrasted FERPA's aggregate language, prohibiting the funding of "any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records In light of this understanding of the Act's purpose, "all children" must be understood to mean "each and every child."
This textual interpretation is bolstered by both the statute's legislative history and litigation brought under the Act. The introduction to the 1994 Act, in which the fundamental accountability procedures were first implemented, begins with the following policy statement:
The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States that a high-quality education for all individuals and a fair and equal opportunity to obtain that education are a societal good, are a moral imperative, and improve the life of every individual, because the quality of our individual lives ultimately depends on the quality of the lives of others.
113
Other legislative history echoes the individual focus and suggests that Congress intended individuals to have a privately enforceable right under NCLB. Since the initial passage of Title I in 1965, more than thirty lawsuits have been brought by parents or other private parties to enforce provisions of Title I. Federal courts have decided these cases on the merits, seeming to assume, without directly addressing, an implied right of action or enforceable rights under section 1983.
114
While these cases were brought mostly in the 1970s before the doctrinal restrictions on finding enforceable rights laid out in Pennhurst, Suter, and Gonzaga, a Senate report accompanying the 1994 Act also evinces the intent to create a privately enforceable right, stating that Justice Stevens' attempt to use the reference to "rights" in the title of FERPA to reach a conclusion of enforceability under § 1983). The title is used here to refine the meaning of the language, not to make a presumption of enforceability based on the use of a word.
111 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (2) The second prong of the Blessing test asks whether the plaintiff's asserted interests are not so vague and amorphous as to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.
117 While NCLB's reference to "fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education" 118 is in itself ambiguous, the Act requires the participating states to define these terms and section 6311(b)(8) specifically requires states to detail the actions they will take to meet them.
119 Under this provision states must articulate how the state will assist the local educational authority (LEA) in providing educational assistance to individual students assessed as needing help to meet state standards and how the SEA will "ensure that poor and minority children are not taught at higher rates than other children by inexperienced, unqualified, or out-of-field teachers."
120
It is these more specific provisions that parents and children would bring section 1983 actions to enforce.
The Civil Rights statutes that the Court held up as models for rights creation follow this same procedure for establishing and enforcing rights.
121
"Discrimination" is a vague and general term that has been defined by laws, administrative regulations, and case law. In the same way, "fair, equal and significant opportunity" is no more of a 115 See William L. Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation and Equal Educational Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1751 , 1767 n.77 (2003 (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-292, at 9 (1994) vague term that has been and will be defined in the same way. The exact nature of an institution's obligation to prevent discrimination is also not clear in the language quoted by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 122 It is only clear that the nature of the state's obligation is absolute, just as in the language in NCLB. The provisions in § 6311(b)(8) force the state to define specific and unambiguous steps to make sure children receive the educational opportunities promised.
123
In Blessing, the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for finding that "Title IV-D creates enforceable rights in families in need of Title IV-D services" without ever specifying "exactly which 'rights' it was purporting to recognize." 124 Instead, the Ninth Circuit found "that federal law gave respondents the right to have the State substantially comply with Title IV-D in all respects."
125 Finding a right created in the purpose statement of the NCLB might seem to apply this "blanket approach" that was negated in Blessing, 126 but none of the faults the Court found in the Ninth Circuit's approach to the statute at issue in that case are present in NCLB.
When a claim is brought against an SEA official under § 6311(b)(8), it will be brought for specific failures of the state to comply with its commitments under one of these five sections.
127
Parties would not bring a general complaint that the state had substantially failed to enforce NCLB. Instead of claiming "undefined rights," a claimant would break the action into "manageable analytic bites." Unlike legislation enacted under § 5, however, legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepted the terms of the "contract."
132
The Pennhurst Court found that the statute in question 133 merely expressed a congressional preference for the systematic improvement of care for mentally disabled individuals by encouraging better planning, coordination, and demonstration projects. 134 For evidence, the Court cited the failure of the statute to condition funding on the state's agreement to meet provisions, as well as Congress's dramatic underfunding of the program. 135 The Court found it inconceivable that participating states were aware of the binding force of the statutory obligations when there was no conditional language and even those administering the statute did not understand it to impose binding obligations.
136
The terms of section 6311(b)(8) are mandatory components of the plan the state must submit to receive funding. The section is titled "Requirement" and it details the ongoing responsibilities of the SEA to individual districts, schools, and students.
137 Unlike the statute in Pennhurst, NCLB is clear that funding rests on state compliance with these responsibilities: "If a State fails to meet any of the requirements of this section, other than the requirements described in paragraph (2000)).
134 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 22. 135 See id. at 23-24 (finding that the implementing regulations stated that the purpose of the Act was to improve and coordinate the provision of services to persons with developmental disabilities and did not empower the Secretary to cut off funds for a failure to deliver the rights claimed under the provisions at issue in the case). 136 The Pennhurst Court explained its rationale by asserting:
In this case, Congress fell well short of providing clear notice to the States that they, by accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply with § 6010. Not only does § 6010 lack conditional language, but it strains credulity to argue that participating States should have known of their "obligations" under § 6010 when the Secretary of HHS, the governmental agency responsible for the administration of the Act and the agency with which the participating states have the most contact, has never understood § 6010 to impose conditions on participating States. 8), making states accountable for providing economically disadvantaged schools and districts with the educational resources necessary to meet the performance standards also created in that act.
139
In 2001 Congress added four other provisions to this section, making state obligations even more clear. 140 While there are still abstract terms, section 6311(b) requires regulations that make the provisions more specific and delineate the steps that states will take to achieve NCLB's goals. Thus, NCLB can be distinguished from the statutes discussed in Pennhurst, 141 Suter, 142 and Blessing, 143 each of which was found to be too vague to create rights. Given these specific implementing regulations, courts will not find it beyond their ability to hold states accountable to these steps.
The states were certainly aware of the magnitude of their commitment under NCLB, and expected to be bound by it. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Pennhurst that "[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."
146
In Gonzaga, the Court followed this approach and looked to the context of the provision in question-its relationship to other clauses and the enforcement mechanisms provided-in determining whether a private right was created.
147
The Gonzaga Court found that the individual rights asserted by the plaintiff, when viewed in the context of the section of FERPA at issue, referred only to the type of "policy or practice" that triggers a funding prohibition.
148
This conclusion, stated the Gonzaga majority, is buttressed by the centralized enforcement mechanism. 149 The Secretary was designated to deal with violations by establishing a compliance office that would review individual complaints and a provision was added to centralize enforcement in order to standardize interpretation of and responsibilities under the Act. 150 The Court then drew a states to comply with NCLB) (last visited Dec. 17, 2004 NCLB's focus on school accountability to parents demonstrates congressional intent that parental action be a central part of the enforcement scheme. The Act repeatedly calls for parents to be informed of the status of the school, their child's teacher, and their options for choice.
152
These notification provisions are designed to stimulate a market-reform model where informed parents become consumers able to force the improvement of not only their own child's school, but of the system as a whole, as schools compete for their children.
153 That Congress intended for parents to be the agents of reform is highlighted by congressional statements about the design of the Act. The same week NCLB was introduced into the House of Representatives, Representative John Boehner made the following statement:
We can give parents the ability to transfer their children out of failing schools-and we must, through private school choice and other means-but even that power is greatly diminished if parents don't know which schools are failing and which are succeeding. Testing produces data-and in the hands of concerned, involved parents, data equals power.
154
It is clear from this statement that Congress intended to empower parents to take action, not just to be informed, and that these individual actions would lead to systemic improvements. 151 479 U.S. 418, 426 (1987) ("Congress' aim was to provide a decentralized . . . administrative process.").
152 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1) (Supp. I 2001) (requiring that the annual state report card be presented in an understandable and uniform format and, to the extent practicable, provided in a language that the parents can understand); id. § 6311(h)(2)(E) (requiring the same for annual local educational agency report cards); id. § 6311(h)(6) (highlighting, in the "Parents right-to-know" section, the LEA's duty to the parents of each student to inform them of the status of their child's teacher and their child's performance on the state academic assessment); see also Henry, supra note 93, at 1165 (noting that "parental empowerment is part of the very purpose of [NCLB]" and that "[s]chool choice is the heart of this educational reform"). 153 For an explanation of how choice-fed competition could lead to better schools, see CHUBB, supra note 31, at 206-15 (arguing that by giving parents choice among public schools while removing guaranteed financial support, schools will improve in response to competitive pressure This week, the House of Representatives will vote on President George W. Bush's plan to inject real accountability into federal education spending. In doing so, we'll have an opportunity to shift a meaningful degree of authority back to parents and communities for the first time since Washington got involved with education policy a generation ago.
155
Congress's vision of improvement through state accountability and parental action is reinforced by the Secretary of Education, who is charged with implementing the Act. In an introduction to a Department of Education NCLB workbook for parents Secretary Rod Paige says, "[n]o one cares more about your child's future than you do, and no one is better positioned to hold schools accountable for performance than you are."
156 The workbook also asserts that "assessments will allow parents and officials to hold schools accountable for ensuring that every child learns." 157 For this model of institutional improvement to succeed, parents must be empowered not only through information, but through the ability to put pressure on the state if it fails to provide the financial and academic support to students and schools promised in section 6311(b)(8). Without the ability to hold states to their promise to provide the information and resources that produce choice, parents are powerless to create the change envisioned by Congress.
While there are provisions for central enforcement, that method of enforcement is of limited utility. Centralized oversight of Title I has been of limited effect in the past and is likely to be so in the future. 158 The only penalty that the Department of Education can impose is a denial of funding, a remedy out of proportion to the nature 155 Id. WHAT "NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND" MEANS FOR AMERICA'S FAMILIES 5, 5 available at http://www.ed.gov/inits/backtoschool/families/families.pdf.
157 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 27, at 9-13 (finding most states out of compliance with the 1994 accountability and assessment requirements of Title I); see also Zamora, supra note 11, at 431-32 (describing the historic and continued lack of departmental enforcement of Title I).
of most infractions, as well as counterproductive to the goal of creating additional resources or options in a district or at a school. Accordingly, this remedy is rarely used. 159 It is clear that Congress and the Department of Education envisioned that parents, as well as Department officials, would hold schools and the state educational agencies accountable for the promises they have made. A private right of parental enforcement, therefore, is necessary for achieving the goal of the Act, an opportunity for an effective education for all children.
E. An Exclusive Enforcement Scheme?
While the scope of the statutory enforcement scheme must be an element considered in determining whether a private right exists, it must be considered once again when a right is found. As Justice O'Connor explained in Blessing v. Freestone: [E] ven if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983. Because our inquiry focuses on congressional intent, dismissal is proper if Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983. Congress may do so expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.
160
When there is no direct prohibition of section 1983 actions, a state has to "make the difficult showing that allowing § 1983 actions to go forward in these circumstances would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme." 161 In Blessing, the Court acknowledged that it has only twice found a scheme to be this comprehensive.
162
There is no persuasive argument that the enforcement scheme in NCLB is comprehensive. In Gonzaga, the Court found that the centralized enforcement scheme of the Family Educational Rights and 159 Cf. Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1858-59 (discussing the problems of exclusive central enforcement). 160 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 161 Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 162 Id. at 347 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (finding that the "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions" of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, including several provisions authorizing private suits, precluded enforcement under section 1983); and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, -12 (1984 (concluding that the "carefully tailored" local administrative procedures created by the Education of the Handicapped Act precluded enforcement under section 1983)).
Privacy Act created evidence against finding a right in the first instance. 163 Since the Court found no right, there was no consideration of whether, on its own, the scheme was so comprehensive as to preclude section 1983 actions. FERPA, however, specifically stated that "[e]xcept for the conduct of hearings, none of the functions of the Secretary under this section shall be carried out in any of the regional offices." 164 This provision was added in reaction to fear "that regionalizing the enforcement of [FERPA] may lead to multiple interpretations of it, and possibly work a hardship on parents, students, and institutions." 165 Accordingly, that enforcement scheme included an administrative system specifically designed to provide individualized administrative enforcement.
166 NCLB contains no provisions restricting decentralized enforcement nor does it create any individualized administrative processes. Moreover, in the only two cases where the Court found enforcement schemes so comprehensive as to preclude private enforcement, the statutes in question included substantial administrative adjudicatory procedures to process and deal with individual complaints.
167
Not only has the Court never found an enforcement comprehensive that lacks any kind of individual process, it has also been hesitant to allow statutes to remain without this characteristic. In Blessing, the Court found it significant that [t] he enforcement scheme that Congress created in Title IV-D is far more limited than those in Sea Clammers and Smith. Unlike the federal programs at issue in those cases, Title IV-D contains no private remedyeither judicial or administrative-through which aggrieved persons can seek redress. The only way that Title IV-D assures that States live up to their child support plans is through the Secretary's oversight. 168 In addition, "no private actor would have standing to force the Secretary to bring suit for specific performance. To the extent that Title IV-D may give rise to individual rights, therefore, we agree . . . the Secretary's oversight powers are not comprehensive enough to close the 163 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289-90. 164 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g) (2000) . 165 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 39,863 (1974) ). 166 The Secretary created the Family Policy Compliance Office "to act as the Review Board required under the Act and to enforce the Act with respect to all applicable programs." Id. at 289. 167 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347. 168 Id. at 348.
door on § 1983 liability." 169 The Court was uncomfortable finding a right with no private remedy at all. 170 For NCLB to be the first statute granting critically important rights, but no corresponding remedy, would be an unfortunate irony given that the effectiveness of the Act relies principally on individual participation and action.
NCLB is clearly intended to benefit children by providing a right to "a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and [S]tate academic assessments."
171
This right is not too imprecise to enforce, because the specific steps a state must take are enunciated clearly in provisions such as section 6311(b)(8). It is also clear that the federal government intended these obligations to be binding. Not only do the language and structure of the Act make that clear, but state failure to live up to Title I obligations was the very impetus for restructuring the law to create greater accountability and add more specific assessment provisions to section 6311(b)(8).
172
In addition, the improvement mechanism at 169 Id. Similarly, it is unlikely that individuals would have standing to sue the Secretary to force compliance. The appropriate action would be to force the Secretary to cut off funding to the State, which is not the compliance remedy parents would seek. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (finding that to have standing, the plaintiff must show "an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision"). 170 Where the statute provides no private remedy and there is no enforcement of rights by a supervisory federal agency, the parties may bring actions against the agency under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that "[t] he Cannon [v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) ] opinion contrasts two private remedies: suit against a discriminatory fund recipient to terminate the offending discrimination; and suit against the government to terminate federal funding. The Court found strong support in legislative history for the former, but resistance on the part of lawmakers toward the latter"). Then-Judge Ginsburg, author of the opinion, noted "the Cannon Court observed that an APA suit to compel investigation and fund termination, although available if no private remedy exists, is far more disruptive of HEW's efforts efficiently to allocate its enforcement resources . . . than a private suit against the recipient of federal aid." Id. at 751 (internal citations omitted). By finding that Congress intended a centralized enforcement scheme, and ruling out any form of private administrative or judicial remedy against the specific offender, a court would leave a far less favored form of remedy as the only remaining option. 171 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. I 2001) . 172 See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 154 (blaming Washington's reluctance to work in the Act requires parental action to force school and district competition. If states were able to prevent parental enforcement actions without repercussion, the entire market mechanism for improvement would fail. Departmental sanctions do not further this kind of choice-based scheme. For these reasons, a court should find that NCLB creates federally enforceable rights under section 6311(b)(8).
IV. REASONS FOR OPEN-MINDED SECTION 1983 JURISPRUDENCE
Since the success of the statutory scheme requires private rights, and Congress clearly intended to create them, there is ample precedent for a court to find enforceable rights under NCLB even given the reluctance toward rights creation evinced in Gonzaga. There is a possibility, however, that language in Gonzaga expressing a general disinclination to imply rights might drown out the decision's precise language suggesting situations when courts can and should find rights.
173
Again, the rights-creating language as well as the purpose and statutory scheme clearly point to an intent to create a private right of action in NCLB. Failing to find such a right within NCLB would reinforce an over-reading of Gonzaga and push rights enforcement law in an unfortunate direction, undermining congressional intent and other values at work in whatever statute is at hand. 174 To avoid that result, Gonzaga should be interpreted by courts as a reaffirmation of the Blessing test for creating rights and the Thiboutot presumption for their enforcement under section 1983. In addition, there are both constihold states accountable for a lack of improvement in education, despite increased Title I spending).
173 It was this tendency that the Third Circuit addressed and corrected in overruling a district court failure to find a private right of action in three provisions of the Medicaid Act, stating that The District Court, relying heavily on Gonzaga University, concluded that Congress had not unambiguously conferred the rights that plaintiffs sought to vindicate under § 1983, and dismissed the suit. At first blush, language in Gonzaga University would appear to support that conclusion. . . .
The Court, no doubt, has set a high bar for plaintiffs. Nonetheless, after having considered the relevant provisions of the Medicaid Act against the backdrop of Gonzaga University, we are convinced that Congress unambiguously conferred the rights which plaintiffs here seek to enforce. Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the District Court. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2004 ) (internal citations omitted). 174 Cf. Samberg-Champion, supra note 20, at 1872 n. 219, 1873-74 & n.230 176 First, the Court will have ignored congressional intent not only in creating an independent remedy for enforcing statutory rights but in reaffirming the meaning of the "and laws" language in section 1983. When, in Thiboutot, the Court first assumed that Congress intended all rights-creating statutes to be so enforced, 177 Congress refused to adopt amendments to limit section 1983 to civil rights statutes.
178 If the same test were applied in section 1983 and implied remedies cases, section 1983 would become redundant because petitioners would have rights directly under the statute in question and would never need to resort to the section 1983 remedy. Second, allu- There is an important class of cases in which the legislature and the executive must depend on the judiciary for the efficacy of their judgments. In these cases, it is judicial refusals to act that pose a danger "to the political rights of the Constitution." Marbury itself recognized this threat, when Chief Justice Marshall observed that the government of the United States could no longer be "termed a government of laws, and not of men . . . if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." (1803)).
177 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1980) . 178 Lisa E. Key described this refusal to limit the scope of section 1983:
In 1981 , 1985 , and again in 1987 Hatch proposed an amendment to § 1983 that would explicitly limit the term "laws" to civil rights laws. The proposed amendment did not pass on any of these occasions. Although this is not evidence of the original intent of the drafters of § 1983, it is evidence of the intent of more recent Congresses to not limit the scope of § 1983 statutory actions to cases arising under civil rights laws. Key, supra note 15, at 313 (footnote omitted).
sions in Gonzaga to the Cort v. Ash test, whose fourth prong evinces federalism concerns, suggests that the Court is engaging in political judgments as to the wisdom of federalizing traditional state tasks. 179 In Rosado v. Wyman, 180 Justice Harlan stated the appropriate role of the Court in interpreting federal funding statutes: "It is, of course, no part of the business of this Court to evaluate, apart from federal constitutional or statutory challenge, the merits or wisdom of any welfare programs, whether state or federal, in the large or in the particular." 181 By imposing judgments as to the appropriateness, rather than legality, of federal policy, the Court impinges on legislative authority and disrespects the separation of powers boundaries discussed by Justice Harlan.
Since there are no constitutional principles mandating a narrow interpretation of rights in spending statutes as in implied remedies cases, the Court has not overturned its Thiboutot and Blessing precedents indicating a separate and more flexible approach to implied rights cases. As the Court impinges on Congress's power and express intent to preserve an independent remedy against state officials for violations of federal statutory rights, it should retain a broader approach to evaluating congressional intent to allocate individual rights. This objective can be realized by maintaining the Blessing test and by allowing Congress to articulate its "unambiguous" intent to benefit a certain class through a wider variety of means than the specific language demanded by Sandoval in implied remedies cases.
B. Undermines Principles of Responsive Government and Individual Participation
Since section 1983 is express evidence of congressional intent to create a remedy, Congress cannot rely on separation of powers grounds to adopt the Sandoval presumption against enforceability or the narrow intent-based test that implements it. The Court's invocation in Not only are policy decisions made to attract wealthy tax-paying residents, but politicians are politically more responsive to wealthy constituents who can contribute more resources toward their reelection.
203
While unequal influence or access is not unconstitutional, there are potentially adverse social and economic ramifications resulting from these inequalities. Policies conceived to attract wealthy residents may benefit the state and local budgets as well as state and local politicians in the short-run, but create long-term local, regional, and national problems that many grantin-aid statutes address.
204
Title I of NCLB is a clear example of this type of legislation. It was created to remedy the economic and social ramifications of states' inability to provide an adequate education for poor students.
205
Assuming that one goal of federalism is to make government responsive to the people, private rights enforcement can serve an important role in allowing individuals without political or economic power to demand state government action on their own. 206 incentives are not effective. To weaken Congress's ability to remedy this failure is to undermine rather than strengthen the ideal of governmental responsiveness.
Participation
Participation is the aspect of federalism most jeopardized by overreading a presumption against enforceability of federal rights into Gonzaga. Granting citizens effective political participation through private rights of action where traditional political mechanisms have failed has local social and economic ramifications that go beyond the adoption of effective policy. When Alexis de Tocqueville sought to explain the value of local democracy in America, he did not speak in terms of efficiency. In fact, he believed that local democratic government was far more inefficient than centralized monarchy.
207
But by allowing individuals an opportunity to shape the policies of their community according to their self-interest, empowered individuals take that spirit of innovation and carry it into their social and economic life:
Aristocracy thinks more about preservation than improvement.
On the contrary, when public authority is in the hands of the people, they, as the sovereign power, seek out improvements in every quarter because of their own discontent.
The spirit of improvement then infiltrates a thousand different areas; it delves into endless detail and above all advocates those sorts of improvements which cannot be achieved without payment; for its concern is to better the condition of the poor who cannot help themselves.
Furthermore, an aimless restlessness permeates democratic societies where a kind of everlasting excitement stimulates all sorts of innovations which almost always involve expense.
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De Tocqueville saw a direct connection between individualized political power, notably for the poor, and the spirit of involvement and in-207 According to de Tocqueville:
Government by one man alone is more consistent in his rule than a crowd would be, supposing equal enlightenment in both both these parties. He displays more persistence, more overall vision, more attention to detail, a better judgment of men. Anyone who refutes these things has either never seen a democratic republic at work or bases his assessment on very few examples. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 285 208 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 246. novation that has distinguished this country and been central to its achievements.
Commentators equate this vision of local democracy and individual political participation with debate in town hall meetings, political rallies, and meetings with local or state representatives.
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This method of placing pressure on representatives is appealing in a way that does not hold true for going to the local federal courthouse to demand state action. There is no difference, however, in the motivation of the individual or in the result for the individual or the community. Where effective political action is denied because of wealth, individual rights enforcement provides the same type of political participation with the same benefits for the individual and the community as a whole.
The school improvement scheme in NCLB is an instance where Congress has sought to create alternative forms of power for the poor to attain congressional reform goals. NCLB seeks to improve failing public schools by instituting competition through accountability and choice. Schools in affluent areas succeed because parents in these communities have the resources to create competition through the option of private school and have the political clout to assure higher levels of funding and attention to problems should the school system fail to respond. 210 The belief in a "Town Hall" solution is flawed be-cause even if poor parents are informed (which they would have to be to take judicial action under NCLB), they do not have the resources or political influence to create options or force governmental attention. Even if their motivation is self-interest, 211 allowing parents access to courts to enforce standards that have been set by the localities and states themselves is a way of encouraging citizens to be involved in the future and success of their community by redressing imbalances in political power.
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Where Congress has constitutionally decided that a national policy is necessary, the democratic goal of local participation is well served through private statutory enforcement. Private action allows each locality to voice the extent to which policies should be enforced and forces citizens to become engaged in policy. If a majority of citizens are unhappy, if the state feels too much financial pressure, or if Congress finds decentralized enforcement too disruptive, each has political and legislative tools at their disposal to correct the situation.
By allowing citizens the authority to hold governments accountable, private rights of action encourage an innovative and entrepreneurial spirit. Professor Karlan, criticizing the Court's growing reluctance to grant private rights of action and the resulting rightsremedies gap, stated:
Presumably, that [gap] will increase the number of uncorrected violations, leaving the right less completely protected. Just as " [t] o the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen," so too, to the extent that the ability to enforce a right is debased, it is that much less a right.
213
Not only does the inability to vindicate rights undermine the value of the right, it undermines the value of the citizen who is left without judicial or political recourse. This situation does damage not just to our self-conception as a country that places a premium on equality, but also to our reliance on each individual's belief in access and opportunity to fuel a productive and innovative society.
For defenders of federalism, the value of state and local government does not lie solely in the institutions themselves, but in their (highlighting the disparity between low and high wealth districts in New Jersey).
211 See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 279 ("If . . . you fail to link the idea of rights to individual self-interest, which is the only fixed point in the human heart, what else have you got to rule the world except fear?"). 212 See supra text accompanying note 206. 213 Karlan, supra note 176, at 195 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) ).
ability to safeguard liberty and produce desirable results such as innovation, participation, and responsiveness. Where governments fail to produce these benefits through traditional political methods, other means are necessary. When evaluating a statute, courts should keep in mind the benefits private enforcement can bring not only to an individual, but to the spirit of a community. And when evaluating congressional intent, it should be remembered that federal statutes often address national needs created by an imbalance of political power that makes private enforcement necessary. Statutes must be interpreted in light of larger principles, but the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the appropriate balance of power between federal and state governments in shaping public policy is one principle that is left to political, not judicial, judgment.
C. A Damaging Presumption Against Effectiveness
In his Wilder dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized what he felt was the majority's unfair assumption that states would not voluntarily live up to the obligations agreed to in exchange for federal funds.
215
The Court's "assumption" in Wilder, however, is supported in that case by evidence of congressional unhappiness with state compliance and evidence of states' failure to comply. On the other hand, to interpret Gonzaga narrowly would have the Court engage in its own "unfair assumption" that Congress has no interest in accomplishing the purposes laid out in its legislation. Should the Court render section 1983 meaningless and reverse the Thiboutot presumption in favor of rights enforcement, the switch would reflect an assumption that if Congress actually wanted to accomplish its goals, lawmakers would say so "unambiguously."
216
Legislative language is often ambiguous due to the necessities of compromise. Moreover, ambiguity may be a purposeful tactic necessary to get majority support. , 627, 640-42 the fact that Congress has unambiguously passed legislation addressing a problem, and the successful passage of the legislation demonstrates that it is a problem with national resonance. State acceptance of federal money unambiguously expresses its recognition of the problem, and acknowledges that the state has not resolved the issue on its own. 218 The purpose of grant-in-aid legislation is not to give money for a promise, but to give money for results. The evolution of Title I reflects the developing awareness that a promise is not sufficient.
Congressional revision of perennially ignored mandates such as Title I demonstrates an intent to demand compliance. Federal agency enforcement has repeatedly proven insufficient for realizing this intent, 219 and as a result many modern grant-in-aid statutes rely heavily on private enforcement. As Professor Karlan has observed, " [t] he idea behind the 'private attorney general' can be stated relatively simply: Congress can vindicate important public policy goals by empowering private individuals to bring suit." 220 
